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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This study has pursued twin objectives: to discover the reasons
for the postwar velocity rise and to develop a new dimension to ve-
locity analysis. The objectives are not unrelated, of course; sectoral
analysis of velocity offers several interesting pieces of information
concerning the rise in aggregate velocity in recent years.
Many of the findings can best be summarized in a series of nega-
tive propositions. Some of these are well known and scarcely require
extensive statistical documentation; others, however, have either
been unexamined or untested prior to the present study.
1. The postwar velocity rise did not result from changes in the
degree of business integration, the volume of financial payments
relative to income payments, or changes in other variables that af-
fect aggregate transactions velocity and income velocity differen-
tially.
2. Velocity—undoubtedly the demand for money as well—is not
the same in all sectors. It is higher in large cities than in small; in
businesses than in the federal government, and in the federal govern-
ment than in households; it is higher in trade than in manufactur-
ing and in manufacturing than in the public utility sector; and, fi-
nally, it is higher in small than in large firms. Furthermore, cyclical
variations in velocity differ by sector, being much more pronounced
for businesses than for others.
3. The postwar velocity rise did not result from an increase in
importance of sectors with relatively low demands for money. In
fact, such structural changes as have occurred appear to have been
velocity-reducing in nature.
4. The velocity rise was not confined to one or two major sectors;
it was a very general phenomenon, taking place in every broadly de-
fined sector and in all but a few of the more narrowly defined busi-
ness sectors. However, the degree of rise has varied substantially
from sector to sector. Taking 1939 as a prewar benchmark, we
found that velocity increased most in large cities, the corporate and
federal sectors, the manufacturing and public utility industries, and
large firms.
5. The postwar velocity rise was not merely a "return to equilib-
rium" after the abnormalities of the war years. We found thata
major part of the wartime velocity declines resulted from shifts in
the ownership of cash, the growth in real income, and the associatedPostwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 531
decline in the cost of holding money forsmall firms—changes
that were permanent rather than transitory. That portion of the
wartime decline that was transitory appears to have been fully re-
versed by about 1949.
6. Analyzing the velocity ratio in terms of its subratios—spend-
ing to assets and assets to cash—we found that the postwar rise in
corporate velocity consisted not of a rise in the ratio of spending to
assets—this ratio has been remarkably stable—but rather of a rise
in the ratio of assets to cash.
7. The postwar rise in corporate velocity is not attributable to a
shift from cash to government securities. In fact, non-financial cor-
porate holdings of government securities in 1957 were smaller, rela-
tive to cash, than a decade earlier. The ratio of corporate spending
to total liquidity (including non-cash liquid assets as well as cash)
probably rose even faster than did corporate velocity.
8. We have failed to discover any clear evidence that the fear of
inflation caused a flight from cash in the postwar period. Total fixed
claims have grown much faster than cash alone, and at about the
same rate as other assets.
These negative propositions add to knowledge of postwar ve-
locity mov.ements, but they leave the basic question unanswered.
Unfortunately, on the basis of existing data, it is not possible to
explain with certainty why velocity rose during this period. It
seems quite clear that the rising cost of holding money, as meas-
ured by the cost of borrowed funds, has been an important force
responsible for higher velocity. Perhaps our key finding has been
that velocity levels at a point in time and velocity changes over
time have been functions of the size of cash holders; in large meas-
ure the industrial differences in postwar velocity behavior are sim-
ply reflections of their differential size structure. The importance
of the cost of holding money as a determinant of these velocity dif-
ferences according to size is suggested by several pieces of evidence:
(1) the higher velocity level of small firms, which face higher bor-
rowing costs than large firms; (2) the higher velocity level of def-
icit firms, which face higher borrowing costs than firms with net in-
come; (3) the dramatic decline in small-firm velocity when business
conditions improved sharply during the early war years; and (4)
the much greater rise in large- than small-firm velocity after 1950,
accompaniedby a greater rise in interest rates on large than on small
bank loans to businesses.
This last item (4) is not as easily attributable to the cost of hold-532 Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money
ing money as are the other three. The fact that the cost of large
bank loans rose more than that of small loans during 1950—57 does
not seem to be sufficiently important to explain the much greater rise
in velocity of large firms. It may well be, although there is no direct
evidence of this, that small firms have been operating in a less elas-
tic segment of the demand function for money in this period, so that
even a general rise in borrowing costs (rather than the differential
rise that took place) would have caused a greater rise in large- than
in small-firm velocity.
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
In at least one important respect the findings of the present study
are at odds with those of my earlier studies of velocity. In Studies
in the Quantity Theory of Money, I concluded:
The above findings offer little support to the hypothesis that velocity move-
ments are mainly a result of changes in the cost of holding money. Whatever
role the cost of holding money may have bad during some periods of our his-
tory, it cannot account for the major velocity changes between 1919 and 195
I now believe that this statement, based on a series of correlations
of measures of aggregate velocity and assorted measures of the cost
of holding money is incorrect. There were two main defects of the
earlier study, as I now view it: (1) it did not include the most rele-
vant concept of the cost of holding money—the cost of borrowed
funds, as represented by interest rates on bank loans; and (2) it did
not make use of sectoral analysis. In short, the cost of holding money
was viewed strictly in terms of investment yields available to holders
of cash, rather than in terms of direct reduction in interest expense
(including cash discounts on trade credit) available to debtors who
hold cash. The present study leads to the conclusion that the latter is
a much more significant determinant of velocity than the former,
and I would expect to find a strong relationship between bank rates
on business loans and business velocity.
Another difference between this and my earlier analysis of veloc-
ity movements relates to the World War II period. In Studies in the
Quantity Theory of Money I placed heavy emphasis on wartime
controls as the reason for the substantial velocity decline. I continue
to feel that economic policy was partly responsible for velocity
movements during the war, but there is convincing evidence in the
present study that velocity would have declined markedly even if
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the early 1940's had been a peacetime period of comparable eco-
nomic growth, price-level stability, and monetary ease.
As was indicated at the outset, the trend of income velocity had
been downward for several decades prior to the end of World War
II. The principal reason for this downtrend appears to have been the
long-term rise in income per capita, aided perhaps by the generally
declining trend of interest
The present sectoral analysis of velocity suggests the possibility
that the secular decline did not occur uniformly in all sectors. If it
is true that the income effect operates mainly on households, it may
well be that the decline in aggregate velocity occurred largely in this
sector. Such a development would imply a gradual increase in the
household share of total cash, except insofar as offset by a decline
in vertical integration of business activity.
In my judgment the income effect still operates much as before
but has been swamped by other developments, such as the rising cost
of holding money, the increased reliance of households on interest-
bearing fixed claims as sources of liquidity, and increased use of
consumer credit. Although some of these developments may well
continue, it appears likely that they will be less important, relative
to the income effect, than in the immediate past. By 1959, interest
rates had approached levels comparable to those of the twenties;
while there is no obvious reason why they cannot rise even more,
substantial further rises seem most unlikely. Similarly, yields on
money substitutes are probably close to their ceilings, and this source
of rising velocity is likely to diminish in importance.
In the business sector we found that most of the velocity rise oc-
curred among large firms and that, by 1957, these firms had nearly
caught up with small firms. The fact that small-firm velocity did not
rise much during a period of rising interest rates, coupled with the
fact that small firms face higher borrowing costs at all times, has
suggested that the demand function for money of large firms may
become less elastic if interest rates continue to rise. Thus business
velocity may have virtually reached a ceiling, regardless of a future
trend to still higher interest rates.
In view of these considerations, it seems unlikely that aggregate
velocity will long continue to rise at anywhere near its recent rate,
and a resumption of the prewar secular decline would not be at all
surprising. The rise in income velocity did slacken somewhat during
53. Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, pp. 218—21. See also Friedman, The
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1957—60,ascompared with 1953—57—a 2.9 per cent annual growth
rate in the later period, 3.4 per cent in the earlier period. However,
it must be admitted that deposit turnover increased substantially in
1959 and 1960, remaining right on its 1946—58 trend.
The foregoing results, though inconclusive and exploratory, clearly
indicate the value of sectoral analyses of velocity. Even within par-
ticular sectors the demand for money appears to be subject to a
great many influences, which may operate dissimilarly in other sec-
tors. The aggregate demand for money and hence aggregate velocity
reflect not only changes that take place within sectors but also
weight shifts and changes in the ratio of income payments to total
payments. Because of the complexity of the forces impinging on ag-
gregate velocity, it seems doubtful that a dependable and workable
aggregate-velocity function exists, except during relatively short pe-
riods characterized by a stable economic structure. This does not
mean that aggregate velocity cannot be studied or that velocity
changes cannot be forecast. On the contrary, there is every reason
to hope that, by disaggregating velocity, we can substantially im-
prove our understanding of the behavior of money.
The least-known area in velocity studies is the household sector.
Until some method is devised of investigating velocity differences
among income, age, and other classes of households, we shall con-
tinue to be ignorant of major factors affecting the aggregate velocity
of money. One way of approaching this problem would be to exam-
ine deposit turnovers in a sample of individual checking accounts
and to gather income and other data from depositors by interview.
The difficulties are obvious.
In the meantime, however, the data sources utilized above have
by no means been exhausted, and in time new data will accumulate.
Much progress can be expected from more intensive analyses along
the lines indicated here.